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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. HALE 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
KURT BECKSTEAD and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants / Respondents. 
CaseNo.20030641-SC 
Priority No. 12 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON CERTIORARI 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN, §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in concluding that the Utah Supreme Court had 
overruled, sub silento, Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.l989)5 and, in so 
doing, err in affirming the district court's conclusion that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of 
care. 
Because the determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate presents a 
question of law, the decision of the lower court is afforded no deference. See Doit, Inc. v. 
louche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "the issue ofKwhether a 
"duty" exists is a question of law5 which [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness.55 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) (quoting Weber v. 
Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah 1986)). 
CITATION TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The subject decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was published as Hale v. 
Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There is no constitutional or statutory text the interpretation of which is 
determinative in deciding the issue presented by this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceeding. This is a petition by which Plaintiff and Petitioner, John D. Hale, 
has sought review of a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, Honorable Judges Judith 
M. Billings, Gregory K. Orme, and William A. Thorne, Jr., sitting. 
Course of Proceedings in Lower Courts. Plaintiff initiated a suit for damages against 
Defendant in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, the Honorable G. 
Rand Beacham presiding. Defendant moved for summary judgment contending that 
because Plaintiff was an independent contractor whose performance was not supervised 
by Defendant, Defendant owed Plaintiff "no duty of care concerning the safety of the 
manner or method of performance implemented." R 63. Defendant argued that no duty 
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existed because Beckstead as "an employer or owner that does not control the work of the 
independent contractor has no duty to provide a safe workplace to the employees of the 
independent contractor." R 63. Defendant touted Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 
1999), and Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 2775148 P. 408 (1914), as "[t]he two authoritative 
cases in this area of the law." R 63. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs 
complaint. Plaintiff appealed. 
Disposition in the Utah Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that the analysis Beckstead had offered was incorrect and that "Hale was a 
business visitor, an invitee on Beckstead's land—a status wholly separate from any status 
he may have had as an independent contractor." Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at [^ 11, fh 2. 
As such, Beckstead's reliance on Thompson and Dayton was misplaced. Id. While the 
court of appeals rejected the theory Beckstead advanced, that court affirmed the summary 
judgment concluding that Beckstead owed no duty of care to Hale as a business visitor, 
under the open and obvious danger rule. 
With a footnote in the majority's opinion, the court of appeals concluded that the 
Utah Supreme Court in House v. Armour of America, Inc. 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996) had, 
sub silento, overruled Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). On that 
basis, the court of appeals determined that the open and obvious danger rule was an 
absolute bar to recovery under Utah premises liability law. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240 
at Tj 9, fn 1. The majority of the court of appeals panel undertook to apply the open and 
obvious danger rule, as outlined in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of 
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Torts, without reference to the principles of comparative negligence and, in so doing, 
concluded that because Hale was a business visitor, "Beckstead was relieved of any duty 
to Hale." Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at \ 24. 
RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. Plaintiff complains in this action of injuries he received in a fall. R 100, ^ [ 1. 
2. Defendant was the owner of the property at which Plaintiff fell. R 100, ^ j 2. 
3. A home was under construction on Defendant's property, and Plaintiff was 
inside the partially completed home at the time of Plaintiff s fall. R 101, ^ j 3. 
4. Defendant was acting as his own "general contractor" for the construction of 
the home. R101,TJ4. 
5. Defendant hired Plaintiff to paint the home. R 101, \ 5. 
6. Defendant told Plaintiff generally how the paint should look and bought the 
paint for Plaintiff to use. R 101, ^ 6. 
7. Defendant did not control or direct the manner in which Plaintiff was to paint 
the home. R 101,H 7. 
8. While inside the partially constructed home, Plaintiff inadvertently stepped off 
a second floor balcony and fell to the first level. R 101,1} 8. 
9. There is no evidence that Plaintiff had authority to enter Defendant's premises 
for any purpose other than to complete his contract to paint the home. R 101, ^ 9. 
^he first ten numbered paragraphs are verbatim reproductions of the uncontested 
material facts which the district court identified in support of its ruling. See R 100-101. 
4 
10. Defendant was not in the home when Plaintiff fell, but was out of town on an 
extended vacation. R 101, |^ 10. 
11. The edge of the balcony in question was unprotected and in excess of 6 feet 
(1.8 m) above the lower level. R 3, ffi[ 11-12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in concluding that the Utah Supreme Court had 
overruled, sub silento, Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.1989) in House 
v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). Since the decision in Donahue 
was announced, Utah courts have consistently held that Utah's Comparative Negligence 
Act subsumes the open and obvious danger rule, when a landowner controls or maintains 
an unsafe condition on his property. Donahue v. Durfee, supra] and Laws v. Blanding 
City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App. 1995). 
The court of appeals' interpretation of House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P,2d 
340 (Utah 1996) is misplaced. In House, this Court distinguished Donahue, a premises 
liability case, from the operation of the open and obvious danger rule in the strict products 
liability claim at issue in House. In no event did this Court overrule Donahue by 
implication or otherwise as it pertains to premises liability cases. Assuming for the sake 
of argument the strict products liability principles discussed in House apply to premises 
liability cases, Beckstead is still not absolved of liability for maintaining an unsafe 
condition if it would have been economically feasible for him to protect against the 
danger. 
In conformity with Donahue and the subsequent premises liability cases, the open 
and obvious danger rule as set forth in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts maintains a presence in the distribution of responsibility between the 
landowner and the landowner's guest in considering all the circumstances. However, the 
fact alone that an open and obvious danger exists does not automatically cancel all duty 
the landowner may have owed to his guests in the context of Utah's Comparative 
Negligence Act or sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Beckstead owed a duty to Hale when he invited Hale to paint in the vicinity of an 
unenclosed second-story balcony on his property. The court of appeals' decision 
essentially wipes out all consideration of the duty Beckstead owed Hale based upon a 
mis-application of House. In light of the fact that Utah's Comparative Negligence Act 
has displaced the "all or nothing" effect of contributory negligence theories, Donahue and 
its progeny are the appropriate standards for balancing the relative duties of the 
landowner and his guests. Whether the landowner's maintenance of an open and obvious 
danger or the guest's culpability in sustaining injury in the all the circumstances is a 
question for the trier of fact to consider. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision in 
this case should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT HAD OVERRULED DONAHUE V. DURFEE, 
SUB SILENTO IN HOUSE V. ARMOUR OF AMERICA, INC 
In cases involving licensees and business invitees, a premises liability claim is, in 
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substance, a negligence claim wherein the degree of the duty of care owed by the 
possessor of the premises is determined by the status the claimant enjoys. See Donahue v. 
Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.1989) (comparative negligence applied in premises 
liability case); Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995). 
In Donahue, the plaintiff was installing rain gutter on the roof of a warehouse 
when he stood up and came in contact with an electrical line. He had earlier noted the 
proximity of the line but had not been expressly warned of it. The district court granted 
the defendants summary judgment, concluding the power line in question constituted an 
open and obvious danger and that, accordingly, defendants owed no duty to warn 
Donahue of the danger or otherwise protect him from it. Reversing the dismissal of 
Donahue's complaint, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded: 
Utah has now abandoned its contributory negligence system. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), entitled "Comparative Negligence/5 provides in 
part that "the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery 
by that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) defines 
"fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty... including, but not limited 
to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of 
risk,...." We hold that by enacting the above statutory provisions and 
establishing a comparative negligence system, the Utah Legislature has by 
necessary implication abolished the open and obvious danger rule as an 
absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery. 
780 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added). 
The court went on to note that applying the open and obvious danger rule as an 
absolute bar "is fundamentally incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, 
which requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury based on the relative 
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responsibility of the parties involved." Id. Additionally, the court stated that the fact that 
an open and obvious danger existed could be considered as a secondary matter in 
determining the comparative negligence of the parties. 
In rendering its opinion in the present case, the court of appeals concluded that the 
supreme court had overruled Donahue and that the open and obvious danger rule 
therefore precluded Hale from any type of recovery. The court of appeals' conclusion 
with respect to the viability of Donahue was based primarily upon its reading of this 
Court's opinion in House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). 
However, this Court did not overrule Donahue in House. The court of appeals' 
determination that it did so, sub silento, is contrary to the express language of this Court 
in House and the legislative intent of the comparative negligence statute as well as settled 
premises liability law in Utah. This Court in House mentions Donahue only briefly to 
distinguish House from Donahue as House was a strict products liability claim whereas 
Donahue was a premises liability case. See House, 929 P,2d at 344. By its own terms, 
this Court's discussion of the open and obvious danger rule in House was centered around 
strict products liability only. Id. 
In House, it was argued the manufacturer's failure to warn the plaintiffs decedent 
about the inherent limitations of a bullet proof vest resulted in a violation of a duty to 
warn owed by a commercial supplier. This Court states that in the limited circumstance 
of strict products liability the open and obvious danger rule could be applied to bar 
recovery. The reasoning was that manufacturers of some finished products that are 
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patently dangerous by design cannot be economically designed in a safe manner. As 
such, manufacturers of such products should not be liable to warn that their products are 
patently dangerous. See House, 929 P.2d at 344 (Emphasis added). 
By way of example, this Court identified knives as such a product. Knives are 
designed to cut things and a manufacturer of knives should not be liable for the fact that 
knives are sharp. There is no way a manufacturer of a knife can economically make the 
knife "unsharp." This reasoning makes sense in the context of strict products liability and 
continues to take into account the duty a manufacturer has to make products safe when it 
is economically feasible. 
However, it does not translate equally into premises liability analysis. It is not the 
same to argue that unenclosed second-floor balconies are designed to be fallen off of and 
that the landowner should not be liable for the fact that a person who is on the premises 
by the landowner's invitation indeed falls off of the balcony. One major factor that 
dropped out of the court of appeals5 analysis completely in the premises liability context 
is whether it would have been economically feasible for the landowner to protect against 
the foreseeable harm. Indeed, a $10.00 - $20.00 2x4 temporary railing as used at most 
construction sites would have been economically feasible to protect Hale and the other 
workers from the unprotected balcony. 
In House, this Court simply distinguished the application of premises liability 
principles to strict liability issues. House did not overrule Donahue by implication or 
otherwise. Moroever, Donahue is consistent with the subsequent case law that has 
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addressed premises liability issues. The critical point of reference is that a person who is 
in possession of land and is responsible for creating a hazard on the land owes a duty to 
those he invites onto his land. Under Utah's comparative negligence statute, the 
respective fault of the parties is then weighed by the finder of fact. See Laws v. Blanding 
City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Indeed, sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have always 
articulated viable principles of public policy relating to how the duty of care is distributed 
between the possessor of land and his invitee. Hale has never argued otherwise. Donahue 
never abandoned the approach set forth in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement. 
The opinion in Donahue makes it clear that the open and obvious danger rule was 
abolished to the extent, and only to the extent, the rule would have operated as an 
absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery. See Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1280. 
The proper application of Donahue and its progeny necessarily requires a factual 
determination regarding the reasonableness of the parties "under all the circumstances." 
Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1280. The court in Donahue specifically directed the finder of fact 
in that case to consider not only the existence of the open and obvious clanger, but what 
precautions, if any, were taken by the landowner to prevent injury arising from the open 
and obvious danger. Id. Likewise, the court in Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 
(Utah App. 1995) overturned a jury verdict because the jury instruction did not give the 
finder of fact the ability to consider all the circumstances.2 
2The court of appeals took umbrage with Hale for not presenting evidence regarding how 
Hale's presence on Beckstead's property required a deliberate encounter with the unprotected 
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In Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995), plaintiff initiated an 
action against the defendant city, alleging he was injured as a result of the defendant's 
negligence in the construction and maintenance of the city dump. The jury returned a 
verdict for the city, concluding that the city was not negligent. On appeal, plaintiff 
contended that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 17 
which was taken substantially verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. 
The plaintiff argued that if subsection (b) of section 343 is not read in conjunction with 
the language of section 343 A, it creates the misleading impression that if the plaintiff did 
not realize or protect himself against the danger, the city's duty was abrogated. The court 
of appeals agreed. 
After quoting section 343 A and accompanying comments/and g, the court 
concluded that the trial court had erred in giving the challenged instruction as it was an 
incomplete and thus misleading statement of the city's duty. The question of whether or 
not a reasonable person would, recognizing the danger, nevertheless encounter it, was a 
question for the jury. Laws, 893 P.2d at 1086. In response to the defendant city's 
contention that the district court's comparative negligence instruction, together with the 
special verdict form, had cured any deficiency in the duty instruction, the court of appeals 
balcony. Hale, 2003 UT App. 240 ^  20, fh 4. The procedural history of this issue was 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on whether the landowner owed a duty of care to his 
guests. The weight of Hale's evidence was not at issue in the original motion for summary 
judgment filed by Beckstead upon which the ensuing appeals are based. The original issue, 
couched in terms of the landowner's duty - or lack thereof, was whether the trier of fact could, as 
a matter of law, consider all the circumstances. This is exactly the point the court of appeals 
misses in its failure to apply Donahue or sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement correctly. 
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cited Donahue with approval, declaring: 
If the jury determined that Defendant owed no duty of reasonable care to 
Plaintiff based on the incomplete statement of duty found in Instruction No. 
17, then neither the comparative negligence instruction nor the special 
verdict form would have been helpful. "There would be no negligence to 
compare-and, therefore, no recovery'5 if Defendant's duty were erroneously 
excused because the danger is known or obvious. See [Donahue, 780 P.2d] 
at 1279. We conclude that the instructions as a whole inadequately 
presented the law with respect to Defendant's duty of care and undermined 
Plaintiffs ability to present his theory of the case to the jury. 
Laws, 893 P.2d at 1086. 
In this case, Beckstead was the landowner and general contractor. He was 
responsible for the state of construction in his house at the time that he invited Hale onto 
his property for the purpose of painting the interior of his house. Hale, who was only on 
the premises to perform this contractual service, had no control over the property other 
than to paint. Specifically, Hale did not have responsibility for or control over the 
construction of the second floor balcony or installation of a rail. Further, Beckstead has 
not offered any evidence as to steps he took to protect against the risk of falling from the 
unprotected balcony. Instead, Beckstead appears to argue that he owes no duty, among 
other reasons, because he was on vacation when Hale got injured. 
Beckstead, and not Hale, created the risk of danger by maintaining the unenclosed 
balcony and inviting Beckstead to paint in that area. This is not to say that Hale may not 
bear some fault for falling off of the balcony. However, Beckstead is not an innocent 
party who should be relieved of all liability simply because Hale mis-stepped while 
painting. 
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But this is how the court of appeals has applied sections 343 and 343 A of the 
Restatement in the absence of Donahue and under its reading of the supreme court's strict 
products liability analysis in House v. Armour of America, Inc., supra. In addition, the 
court of appeals tacitly nullifies all factors except the factor at issue in Laws which are 
identified in the comments to section 343 A of the Restatement that would allow the finder 
of fact to take all the circumstances into account when an invitee deliberately encounters 
a known hazard. Hale, 2003 UT App. 240 <{[ 18. Moreover, the court of appeals goes on 
to explain that a business invitee can never overcome the open and obvious danger rule, 
essentially making no distinction as far as the landowner is concerned between a busmess 
mvitee and a mere trespasser. Specifically, the court of appeals cites to a Minnesota case, 
Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1997) for the proposition that a business 
invitee can never overcome a complete bar to recovery under the "deliberate encounter" 
exception.3 
In holding that Beckstead owed Hale no duty whatsoever the court of appeals has 
rendered the open and obvious danger rule an "all OT nothing" doctrine that would deny 
Plaintiff any recovery without regard to the reasonableness of the respective parties' 
3
 What the court of appeals fails to acknowledge is that Sutherland is identical to 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), and Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408 
(1914), which the court of appeals expressly stated did not dispose of the issue regarding Hale's 
status as a business invitee. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at \ 11, fh 2. Like the injured parties in 
Thompson and Dayton, the decedent in Sutherland was the employee of an independent 
contractor who was killed because of the manner he undertook to perform the specialized job the 
independent contractor was hired to do. The ultimate conclusion of the Minnesota court was 
that "as a matter of law [the landowner] owed no duty to Sutherland, an independent contractor's 
employee." Sutherland, 570 N.W.2d at 7-8 (Emphasis added). 
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conduct. Such a conclusion is not in harmony with the authorities that have considered 
the application of other "all or nothing" doctrines in the framework of Utah's comparative 
negligence scheme. In addition, the court of appeals5 conclusion replaces the 
Legislature's authority to pass law with that of the Court of Appeals. 
Common law rules that once may have provided a complete defense in a 
negligence action still have relevance under Utah's comparative negligence system. For 
example, in Jacobsen Const, v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), the 
supreme court noted: 
We thus hold that under our comparative negligence statute "assumption of 
risk" language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be treated, in its secondary sense, 
as contributory negligence. Specifically, and with particular reference to 
our comparative negligence act, the reasonableness of plaintiff s conduct in 
confronting a known or unknown risk created by defendant's negligence 
will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. 
Attention should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
exercise of due care would have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge of 
it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in 
which the plaintiff acted in light of all the surrounding circumstances, 
including the appreciated risk. Then, if plaintiff s unreasonableness is 
viewed to be less than that of defendant, according to the terms of the 
statute, "any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering." 
Id. at 312 (citation omitted). 
In Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the supreme court concluded that 
the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort doctrine was extinguished with the 
enactment of Utah's comparative negligence act declaring that "assumption of risk, last 
clear chance, and discovered peril resemble the old contributory negligence doctrine in 
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that they are 'all or nothing5 doctrines in terms of recovery by the plaintiff.55 Id. at 598. 
Nevertheless, the court stated: 
Our decision here does not preclude argument to the jury as to whether a 
party may or may not have had the "last clear chance" to avoid injury. 
However, the old "all or nothing55 doctrine is now subsumed within 
comparative negligence and, as bearing on which party was guilty of the 
greater negligence, "last clear chance55 becomes just one of many factors to 
be weighed in the comparison by the finder of fact. 
Id. at 598, fti. 7. 
The abolition of the open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar does not 
mean that the underlying principles of public policy relating to how the duty of care is 
distributed between the possessor of land and his invitee are likewise abolished. Clearly, 
the conduct of one who voluntarily assumes a known risk remains relevant in the context 
of comparative negligence notwithstanding the fact that his assumption of such risk may 
no longer be asserted as an absolute bar to his recovery. Likewise, the open and obvious 
danger rule remains relevant as one of the factors to be considered in weighing the 
claimant's negligence in approaching the danger and the landowner's failure to abate it. 
This case, like Donahue, illustrates why the open and obvious danger should 
continue to operate as a factor, and not a complete bar to recovery, in premises liability 
cases. This is especially true where Hale, as a business invitee, was more than a mere 
trespasser on the property. Under Utah's comparative negligence act, as well as a 
complete reading of sections 343 and 343 A, the finder of fact should consider all the 
circumstances, including what steps, if any, Beckstead took to protect against the risk of 
danger. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing it is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals erred 
in concluding that Donahue v. Durfee had been effectively overruled. Accordingly the 
decision of the court of appeals should be reversed. 
DATED this \V day of March, 2004. 
V^A^ron J. Prisb: 
Elizabeth B. Gri: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j~t) day of day of March, 2004, two (2) copies of the 
foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON CERTIORARI were mailed, postage prepaid, as 
follows: 
Bryan J. Pattison 
Brent M. Brindley 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, UT 84771-0400 
'A^ 
)N J. P: 
Attorney for oner 
16 
I hereby certify that no addendum is required for the Petitioner's Brief on Certiorari in the matter 
o[John D. Hahrv^JCurt Beckstead, Supreme Court Case No, 20030641-SC 
